Social protection in crisis: a myth buster

This brief addresses common myths surrounding the use of social protection systems for delivering assistance during crises. It provides evidence demonstrating that social protection systems can be effective, efficient, and adaptable channels for crisis response. The information aims to encourage humanitarian actors, donors, and policymakers to consider a “Social Protection First” approach, leveraging existing systems rather than defaulting to parallel humanitarian structures.

Core Arguments & Findings

The document systematically debunks nine common myths, presenting evidence to support the use of social protection systems in crisis contexts:

• Speed and Scale (Myth 1): Contrary to the belief that they are slow, existing social protection systems have proven instrumental in achieving timely and large-scale responses in countries like Fiji, Philippines, Nepal, Turkey, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Pre-established mechanisms enabled fund disbursement within weeks of drought onset in Kenya and Ethiopia, outpacing parallel systems. In Somalia, the system reached 930,000 people during drought/floods, including pre-emptive transfers. Ethiopia’s system reached conflict-displaced IDPs in 2-3 months, compared to 6 months via traditional channels (Myth 1). Well-designed routine systems offer the most anticipatory form of action.

• Cost-Effectiveness (Myth 2): Channelling funds through social protection systems is often more cost-efficient and cost-effective than using separate humanitarian channels. Savings arise from using established processes, economies of scale, and negotiating power. Examples include Turkey’s refugee assistance and the Philippines’ Typhoon Haiyan response, where delivery costs via the existing system were significantly lower (1% vs 2.2% via NGOs) (Myth 2). Anticipatory action through safety nets yields further cost-efficiencies, with analysis showing substantial net benefits (Myth 2).

• Adaptability (Myth 3): Social protection systems are not inherently rigid; they can be designed in advance to be flexible and adaptive (“shock-responsive”) during crises. Common adaptations include maintaining transfers, adjusting values, modifying targeting/eligibility, simplifying registration, changing payment logistics, surging workforce, and amending regulations via emergency decrees (Myth 3). Stronger existing systems with pre-arranged flexibility perform better.

• Collaboration & Mandates (Myth 4): Despite differences, humanitarian and social protection actors share fundamental goals: protecting the vulnerable, helping people withstand crises, promoting dignity and human rights, ensuring non-discrimination, and addressing basic needs. These commonalities provide a basis for collaboration, leveraging similar operational processes (Myth 4).

• Data Sharing (Myth 5): Sharing beneficiary lists or registration data between humanitarian and social protection sectors is feasible and can work well under specific conditions: strong data protection/privacy guarantees, mature government information systems, and capacity for strategic data use. Examples from Somalia, Colombia, Mauritania, and others show potential for improved targeting and response times. Pre-identified protocols are critical to prevent illegitimate or forced data sharing (Myth 5).

• Working with Governments & Principles (Myth 6): Engaging with government systems aligns with numerous international resolutions (e.g., UN Res 46/182) and frameworks (e.g., HDP Nexus, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States) that emphasize the state’s primary role, national ownership, and avoiding undermining national institutions. Independence and neutrality do not necessitate disengagement. Social protection is also a human right with principles similar to humanitarian ones (Myth 6).

• Neutrality & Diversion Risk (Myth 7): Aid delivered through parallel humanitarian systems is not immune to interference or diversion, as demonstrated by recent scandals. All aid delivery mechanisms face these pressures; using government systems is not inherently riskier if managed appropriately (Myth 7).

• Feasibility in Fragile/Conflict Settings (Myth 8): Engagement with government social protection systems is often feasible even in fragile and conflict settings, although careful case-by-case assessment is crucial. Research from Armenia, Niger, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Sudan shows examples of successful engagement. It may involve working with regional or technical bodies rather than high-level political figures (Myth 8).

• Resource Mobilization (Myth 9): Strengthening social protection systems for crisis response mobilizes additional financing, primarily from development donors (like the World Bank, EU, Germany) whose funds may not be available for direct humanitarian operations. This complements humanitarian funding and reduces the overall humanitarian caseload, rather than diverting resources. Humanitarian actors can support system-building (e.g., data sharing) cost-effectively (Myth 9).

Key Statistics & Data

• Philippines Typhoon Haiyan Response: Delivery costs via existing cash transfer systems were 1% of the cash value disbursed, compared to 2.2% via NGO channels (Myth 2).
• Anticipatory Safety Nets: Analysis indicates that every US$1spentonsafetynetsresultsinnetbenefits(savings)ofUS$2.3 (Myth 2).
• Somalia Crisis Response: Social protection architecture channeled funds to an additional 930,000 people in response to drought and floods, including pre-emptive cash transfers to 200,000 people (Myth 1).
• Ethiopia IDP Response: Shock-responsive cash transfers reached conflict-displaced households in 2-3 months, compared to 6 months via traditional humanitarian channels (Myth 1).
• World Bank IDA Funding in Yemen (2021-2023): Provided $570 million for social protection, accounting for 70% of total donor funding in this area during that period (Myth 9).

Methodology

The brief synthesizes evidence from a range of crises across multiple countries, drawing on research conducted or compiled by STAAR (Supporting Transformation, Adaptive Resilience) and BASIC Research (Better Assistance in Crises). The approach involves presenting counter-arguments and supporting evidence (often from specific country case studies or program data) to refute common misconceptions about using social protection systems in crises.

Key Conclusions & Recommendations

• Conclusions: The prevailing myths that social protection systems are too slow, expensive, or rigid for crisis response are largely inaccurate based on global evidence. These systems can be effective, efficient, and adaptable tools. Collaboration between humanitarian and social protection actors is feasible and beneficial. Engaging with and strengthening national systems aligns with international commitments, promotes sustainability, and can mobilize additional resources beyond traditional humanitarian funding.

• Recommendations (Implied):

  • Adopt a “Social Protection First” approach: Actively consider using and strengthening national social protection systems as a primary option for crisis response.
  • Invest in preparedness: Design flexibility and contingency plans into social protection systems before crises occur.
  • Foster collaboration: Pursue partnerships and coordination between humanitarian, development, and government actors involved in social protection and crisis response.
  • Enable data sharing: Develop and implement robust protocols for responsible and secure data sharing to improve targeting and efficiency.
  • Engage contextually: Assess the feasibility and appropriateness of engaging with government systems on a case-by-case basis, particularly in fragile contexts, but do not dismiss it outright.

• Limitations Acknowledged: The effectiveness of data sharing depends on strong data protection measures and mature systems (Myth 5). Engagement in fragile contexts requires careful assessment (Myth 8). The performance of adaptive social protection is better when systems are already strong and arrangements for flexing are pre-established (Myth 3).

Stated or Implied Applications

• Delivering emergency cash transfers via national systems during various crises (drought, flood, conflict, pandemic).
• Implementing anticipatory action (early response based on forecasts) through existing safety net programs.
• Improving aid targeting and efficiency by linking humanitarian databases with government social registries under strict data protection protocols.
• Mobilizing development finance (e.g., from World Bank, bilateral donors) for crisis response in fragile states through investments in social protection capacity.
• Designing or reforming national social protection programs to include specific mechanisms for scaling up or adapting assistance during shocks.

Key Questions Addressed or Raised

• Addressed:
  • Are social protection systems too slow, costly, or rigid for crisis response? (Evidence suggests No)
  • Can humanitarian and social protection actors collaborate effectively? (Yes)
  • Is data sharing between sectors feasible and safe? (Yes, with conditions)
  • Is working with governments compatible with humanitarian principles and feasible in conflict? (Often Yes, requires assessment)
  • Does strengthening social protection divert humanitarian funds? (No, it mobilizes additional resources)
• Raised (Implied):
  • How can flexibility best be institutionalized within social protection systems before crises?
  • What are the most effective models and protocols for safe and ethical data sharing between humanitarian and government systems?
  • What are the specific conditions and risk mitigation strategies for effective engagement with government systems in different fragile contexts?
  • How can coordination between development and humanitarian funding streams for shock-responsive social protection be optimized?